Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise

It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the re...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jeppsson, Sofia (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2016]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 5, Pages: 1225-1240
IxTheo Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Determinism
B The ability to do otherwise
B Compatibilism
B Objective reasons
B ‘ought’ implies ‘can’
B Incompatibilism
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)

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