RT Article
T1 Disgust as Heuristic
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 19
IS 3
SP 679
OP 693
A1 Fischer, Bob 198X-
LA English
YR 2016
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1565746619
AB Suppose that disgust can provide evidence of moral wrongdoing. What account of disgust might make sense of this? A recent and promising theory is the social contagion view, proposed by Alexandra Plakias. After criticizing both its descriptive and normative claims, I draw two conclusions. First, we should question the wisdom of drawing so straight a line from biological poisons and pathogens to social counterparts. Second, we don’t need to explain the evidential value of disgust by appealing to what the response tracks. These lessons point toward an alternative: namely, that disgust is a moral heuristic. On the heuristic view, disgust is a trigger for the subconscious use of a particular rule: < If x is disgusting, and we wouldn’t do x, then x is morally wrong. > I show how this view fits with a plausible hypothesis about the social function of disgust, and then apply it to Leon Kass’s famous use of repugnance to criticize cloning.
K1 Alexandra Plakias
K1 Disgust
K1 Leon Kass
K1 MORAL HEURISTICS
K1 social contagion
DO 10.1007/s10677-015-9673-6