Fairness as Appropriate Impartiality and the Problem of the Self-Serving Bias
Garrett Cullity contends that fairness is appropriate impartiality (See Cullity (2004) Chapters 8 and 10 and Cullity (2008)). Cullity deploys his account of fairness as a means of limiting the extreme moral demand to make sacrifices in order to aid others that was posed by Peter Singer in his semina...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
|
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2016]
|
| Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2016, Volume: 19, Número: 3, Páginas: 695-709 |
| Classificações IxTheo: | NCA Ética VA Filosofia ZD Psicologia |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Moral Demandingness
B Impartiality B Self-Serving Bias B Justiça B Murphy B Poverty Alleviation B Cullity, Broome B Moral Obligation |
| Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Resumo: | Garrett Cullity contends that fairness is appropriate impartiality (See Cullity (2004) Chapters 8 and 10 and Cullity (2008)). Cullity deploys his account of fairness as a means of limiting the extreme moral demand to make sacrifices in order to aid others that was posed by Peter Singer in his seminal article Famine, Affluence and Morality. My paper is founded upon the combination of (1) the observation that the idea that fairness consists in appropriate impartiality is very vague and (2) the fact that psychological studies show the self-serving bias is especially likely to infect ones judgements when the ideas involved are vague. I argue that Cullitys solution to extreme moral demandingness is threatened by these findings. I then comment on whether some other theories of fairness are vulnerable to the same objection. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9665-6 |
