A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism
If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral realit...
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Otros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado: |
[2016]
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En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2016, Volumen: 19, Número: 3, Páginas: 591-602 |
Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCA Ética VA Filosofía |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Grounding
B Morality B Objectivity B Realism B Anti-realism B Metaethics |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |