Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist?

The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this que...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Jaquet, François (Author) ; Naar, Hichem 1985- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2016]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 1, Pages: 193-207
IxTheo Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Belief
B Fictionalism
B Prescriptive metaethics
B Make-believe
B Error Theory
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)

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520 |a The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to replace them with attitudes that resemble to some extent the attitudes we have towards pieces of fiction. But there is now a third theory on the market: conservationism, the view that we should keep holding moral beliefs, even though we know them to be false. (According to a fourth theory, ‘substitutionism’, we should modify the content of our moral claims in such a way that they become true.) Putting abolitionism (and substitutionism) aside, our aim is to assess the plausibility of conservationism as an alternative to the - relatively dominant - fictionalism that we find in the literature. Given the difficulty of finding a conservationist view that is both (i) plausible and (ii) not merely a terminological variant of fictionalism, we will argue that conservationism fails to constitute a plausible alternative to fictionalism, at least insofar as it purports to be an alternative view as to what we should do with our moral thoughts. 
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