Frames, Choice-Reversal, and Consent
Recently Jason Hanna has argued that a particular type of susceptibility to framing effectsnamely, the tendency to reverse ones choice between certain logically equivalent framesinvalidates actual tokens of consent. Here I argue that this claim is false: proneness to choice-reversal per se betwee...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
[2015]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2015, Τόμος: 18, Τεύχος: 5, Σελίδες: 1049-1057 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCA Ηθική ZD Ψυχολογία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Rights
B Consent B Framing effects B Autonomy |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | Recently Jason Hanna has argued that a particular type of susceptibility to framing effectsnamely, the tendency to reverse ones choice between certain logically equivalent framesinvalidates actual tokens of consent. Here I argue that this claim is false: proneness to choice-reversal per se between the relevant types of frames does not invalidate consent. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9581-9 |
