Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity
Whereas most moral philosophers believe that the facts as to what were morally required to do are grounded by the facts about our moral reasons, which in turn are grounded by non-normative facts, I propose that moral requirements are directly grounded by non-normative facts. This isnt, however, to...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2015, Volume: 18, Issue: 4, Pages: 703-716 |
IxTheo Classification: | NCB Personal ethics VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Blameworthiness
B Moral Deliberation B Moral requirements B Grounding B Reasons-first B Moral Reasons |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |