How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment?: Dumbfounding and Disengagement
Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other peoples behavior, that moral reasoning is biased an...
| 發表在: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| 主要作者: | |
| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 載入...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| IxTheo Classification: | NCB Personal ethics ZD Psychology |
| Further subjects: | B
Cognitive Dissonance
B Moral dumbfounding B Emotion B Moral Reasoning B Reason B Moral Disengagement |
| 在線閱讀: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| 總結: | Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other peoples behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Banduras experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9575-7 |