How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment?: Dumbfounding and Disengagement
Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other peoples behavior, that moral reasoning is biased an...
Опубликовано в: : | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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Главный автор: | |
Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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Индексация IxTheo: | NCB Индивидуальная этика ZD Психология |
Другие ключевые слова: | B
Cognitive Dissonance
B Moral dumbfounding B Emotion B Moral Reasoning B Reason B Moral Disengagement |
Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Итог: | Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other peoples behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Banduras experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9575-7 |