How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment?: Dumbfounding and Disengagement

Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased an...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Publié dans:Ethical theory and moral practice
Auteur principal: Hindriks, Frank A. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
En cours de chargement...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2015]
Dans: Ethical theory and moral practice
Classifications IxTheo:NCB Éthique individuelle
ZD Psychologie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Cognitive Dissonance
B Moral dumbfounding
B Emotion
B Moral Reasoning
B Reason
B Moral Disengagement
Accès en ligne: Accès probablement gratuit
Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Résumé:Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Bandura’s experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contient:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9575-7