How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment?: Dumbfounding and Disengagement
Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other peoples behavior, that moral reasoning is biased an...
| Τόπος έκδοσης: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCB Ατομική Ηθική ZD Ψυχολογία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Cognitive Dissonance
B Moral dumbfounding B Emotion B Moral Reasoning B Reason B Moral Disengagement |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other peoples behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Banduras experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9575-7 |