RT Article
T1 How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment?: Dumbfounding and Disengagement
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 18
IS 2
SP 237
OP 250
A1 Hindriks, Frank A.
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2015
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1565677536
AB Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Bandura’s experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments.
K1 Cognitive Dissonance
K1 Emotion
K1 Moral Disengagement
K1 Moral dumbfounding
K1 Moral Reasoning
K1 Reason
DO 10.1007/s10677-015-9575-7