Options for Hybrid Expressivism
In contemporary metaethics, various versions of hybrid expressivism have been proposed according to which moral sentences express both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs. One important advantage with such positions, its proponents argue, is that they, in contrast to pure expressivism, have a straig...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2015]
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| В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2015, Том: 18, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 91-111 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | NCA Этика VA Философия |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Metaethics
Hybrid expressivism
Frege-Geach problem
Internalism
Conventional implicature
Conversational implicature
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| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Итог: | In contemporary metaethics, various versions of hybrid expressivism have been proposed according to which moral sentences express both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs. One important advantage with such positions, its proponents argue, is that they, in contrast to pure expressivism, have a straightforward way of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem. In this paper, I provide a systematic examination of different versions of hybrid expressivism with particular regard to how they are assumed to evade this problem. The major conclusion is that none of these views succeeds to provide both a fully satisfying interpretation of moral sentences and a convincing response to the Frege-Geach problem. I end by briefly considering alternative hybrid views that employ the notion of conventional or conversational implicature. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-014-9511-2 |
