RT Article
T1 Options for Hybrid Expressivism
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 18
IS 1
SP 91
OP 111
A1 Strandberg, Caj
LA English
YR 2015
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1565664841
AB In contemporary metaethics, various versions of hybrid expressivism have been proposed according to which moral sentences express both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs. One important advantage with such positions, its proponents argue, is that they, in contrast to pure expressivism, have a straightforward way of avoiding the Frege-Geach problem. In this paper, I provide a systematic examination of different versions of hybrid expressivism with particular regard to how they are assumed to evade this problem. The major conclusion is that none of these views succeeds to provide both a fully satisfying interpretation of moral sentences and a convincing response to the Frege-Geach problem. I end by briefly considering alternative hybrid views that employ the notion of conventional or conversational implicature.
K1 Metaethics : Hybrid expressivism : Frege-Geach problem : Internalism : Conventional implicature : Conversational implicature
DO 10.1007/s10677-014-9511-2