Effective Skeptical Arguments
Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios (those that can power a prima facie compelling skeptical argument) all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So...
| Authors: | ; |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2015
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2015, Volume: 5, Issue: 1, Pages: 55-60 |
| Further subjects: | B
Skepticism
dreaming
closure principle
underdetermination principle
KK principle
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
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| 520 | |a Peter Murphy has argued that effective skeptical scenarios (those that can power a prima facie compelling skeptical argument) all have the following feature: the subject involved in the scenario does not know that some ordinary proposition is true, even if the proposition is true in the scenario. So the standard “false belief” conception of skeptical scenarios is wrong, since the belief of the targeted proposition need not be mistaken in the scenario. Murphy then argues that this observation engenders a problem for skeptical arguments: they require the KK principle. We respond to this criticism on behalf of the skeptic in our paper. | ||
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