Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios
What is the role of sceptical scenarios—dreams, evil demons, brains in a vat—in sceptical arguments? According to the error view, sceptical scenarios illustrate the possibility of massive falsity in one’s beliefs, whereas according to the ignorance view, they illustrate the possibility of massive ig...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2015
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2015, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 269-295 |
| Further subjects: | B
Cartesian scepticism
sceptical scenarios
brain in a vat
error-possibilities
ignorance-possibilities
ignorance view
epistemic closure
kk-principle
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
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| 520 | |a What is the role of sceptical scenarios—dreams, evil demons, brains in a vat—in sceptical arguments? According to the error view, sceptical scenarios illustrate the possibility of massive falsity in one’s beliefs, whereas according to the ignorance view, they illustrate the possibility of massive ignorance not necessarily due to falsity. In this paper, the ignorance view is defended by surveying the arguments in favour of it and by replying to two pressing objections against it. According to the first objection, the ignorance view illicitly introduces the kk-principle into sceptical arguments. In reply I argue that kk is not less plausible than its main rival, the closure principle. According to the second objection, relying on veridical ignorance-possibilities contradicts the transparency of belief. In reply I introduce a version of transparency that is consistent with the ignorance view. | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Cartesian scepticism |x sceptical scenarios |x brain in a vat |x error-possibilities |x ignorance-possibilities |x ignorance view |x epistemic closure |x kk-principle | |
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