A phenomenal conservative perspective on religious experience
Can religious experience justify belief in God? We best approach this question by splitting it in two: (1) Do religious experiences give their subjects any justification for believing that there is a God of the kind they experience? And (2) Does testimony about such experiences provides any justific...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| В: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Год: 2017, Том: 81, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 247-261 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Религиозный опыт
/ Доказательство существования Бога
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| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Phenomenal Conservatism
B Conservatism B Experience (Religion) B Religious Experience B Credulity B Swinburne B Disagreement B Religious Aspects B Principle of Credulity B God B Swinburne, Richard |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | Can religious experience justify belief in God? We best approach this question by splitting it in two: (1) Do religious experiences give their subjects any justification for believing that there is a God of the kind they experience? And (2) Does testimony about such experiences provides any justification for believing that there is a God for those who are not the subject of the experience? The most popular affirmative answers trace back to the work of Richard Swinburne, who appeals to the Principle of Credulity and the Principle of Testimony. Since then, development of his line of reasoning has gone in a number of distinct directions. Here I propose yet another development. I argue first that the Principle of Credulity is false on the grounds that it has several implausible commitments. I then offer a Phenomenal Conservative perspective on the epistemology of religious experience suggesting a categorically affirmative answer to (1) but a nuanced answer to (2) which allows the possibility of reasonable disagreement about religious experience. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9557-7 |