RT Article
T1 A phenomenal conservative perspective on religious experience
JF International journal for philosophy of religion
VO 81
IS 3
SP 247
OP 261
A1 Burns, Aaran
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2017
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1559355468
AB Can religious experience justify belief in God? We best approach this question by splitting it in two: (1) Do religious experiences give their subjects any justification for believing that there is a God of the kind they experience? And (2) Does testimony about such experiences provides any justification for believing that there is a God for those who are not the subject of the experience? The most popular affirmative answers trace back to the work of Richard Swinburne, who appeals to the Principle of Credulity and the Principle of Testimony. Since then, development of his line of reasoning has gone in a number of distinct directions. Here I propose yet another development. I argue first that the Principle of Credulity is false on the grounds that it has several implausible commitments. I then offer a Phenomenal Conservative perspective on the epistemology of religious experience suggesting a categorically affirmative answer to (1) but a nuanced answer to (2) which allows the possibility of reasonable disagreement about religious experience.
K1 Conservatism
K1 Credulity
K1 Disagreement
K1 Experience (Religion)
K1 God
K1 Phenomenal Conservatism
K1 Principle of Credulity
K1 Religious Aspects
K1 Religious Experience
K1 Swinburne
K1 Swinburne, Richard
DO 10.1007/s11153-015-9557-7