Best feasible worlds: divine freedom and Leibniz's Lapse

William L. Rowe's argument against divine freedom has drawn considerable attention from theist philosophers. One reply to Rowe's argument that has emerged in the recent literature appeals to modified accounts of libertarian freedom which have the result that God may be free even if he nece...

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主要作者: Mooney, Justin (Author)
格式: 電子 Article
語言:English
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出版: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2015
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, 卷: 77, 發布: 3, Pages: 219-229
Further subjects:B Leibniz's Lapse
B Molinism
B Divine Freedom
B 宗教 Philosophy
B ROWE, William L., 1931-2015
B Libertarianism
B analytic philosophy
B Religious Aspects
B Best possible world
B Liberty
B Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
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總結:William L. Rowe's argument against divine freedom has drawn considerable attention from theist philosophers. One reply to Rowe's argument that has emerged in the recent literature appeals to modified accounts of libertarian freedom which have the result that God may be free even if he necessarily actualizes the best possible world. Though in many ways attractive, this approach appears to lead to the damning consequence of modal collapse i.e., that the actual world is the only possible world. But appearances can be deceiving, and in this paper I argue that the threat of modal collapse dissolves when we consider Alvin Plantinga's critique of the purportedly Leibnizian notion that God can actualize any possible world, and incorporate the implications of this critique into the divine freedom debate. Developing a suggestion by Edward R. Wierenga, I argue first that the modal collapse objection fails within a Molinist context, and then I extend the discussion beyond that context to show that the objection also fails on the assumption that Molinism is false.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9497-7