A simpler free will defence
Otte (Philos Phenomenol 78(1):165-177, ) and Pruss (Faith Philos 29(4):400-415, ) have produced counterexamples to Plantinga's (The nature of necessity, ) famous free will defence against the logical version of the problem of evil. The target of this criticism is the possibility of universal tr...
| Autori: | ; |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2015
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2015, Volume: 77, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 197-203 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Free Will
B FREE will & determinism B Free Will Defence B GOOD & evil B Libertarianism B Plantinga, Alvin B problem of evil B God B Necessity (Philosophy) |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | Otte (Philos Phenomenol 78(1):165-177, ) and Pruss (Faith Philos 29(4):400-415, ) have produced counterexamples to Plantinga's (The nature of necessity, ) famous free will defence against the logical version of the problem of evil. The target of this criticism is the possibility of universal transworld depravity, which is crucial to Plantinga's defence. In this paper, we argue that there is a simpler and more plausible free will defence that does not require the possibility of universal transworld depravity or the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. We assume only (a) that libertarianism is possibly true and (b) that God's existence is consistent with the existence of free agents who never go wrong. We conclude the paper by explaining how our defence may be able to succeed without assuming (a), in a way that is consistent with compatibilism. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9512-7 |
