RT Article
T1 A simpler free will defence
JF International journal for philosophy of religion
VO 77
IS 3
SP 197
OP 203
A1 Bernstein, C'Zar
A2 Helms, Nathaniel
LA English
YR 2015
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/155917563X
AB Otte (Philos Phenomenol 78(1):165-177, ) and Pruss (Faith Philos 29(4):400-415, ) have produced counterexamples to Plantinga's (The nature of necessity, ) famous free will defence against the logical version of the problem of evil. The target of this criticism is the possibility of universal transworld depravity, which is crucial to Plantinga's defence. In this paper, we argue that there is a simpler and more plausible free will defence that does not require the possibility of universal transworld depravity or the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. We assume only (a) that libertarianism is possibly true and (b) that God's existence is consistent with the existence of free agents who never go wrong. We conclude the paper by explaining how our defence may be able to succeed without assuming (a), in a way that is consistent with compatibilism.
K1 Free Will
K1 Free Will Defence
K1 FREE will & determinism
K1 God
K1 GOOD & evil
K1 Libertarianism
K1 Necessity (Philosophy)
K1 Plantinga, Alvin
K1 problem of evil
DO 10.1007/s11153-015-9512-7