Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism

I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue ( pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law's (Relig Stud 46(3):353-...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Weaver, Christopher (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2015
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Further subjects:B Rationalism
B God Omniscience
B GOOD & evil
B Omnipotence
B Evil god challenge
B Reasons internalism
B Religious Aspects
B Research
B Moral rationalism
B God
B Metaethics
B Evidential problem of evil
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue ( pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law's (Relig Stud 46(3):353-373, ) evil god challenge.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9472-3