Is My Feeling Your Pain Bad for Others? Empathy as Virtue Versus Empathy as Fixed Trait

The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it alw...

ver descrição completa

Na minha lista:  
Detalhes bibliográficos
Outros títulos:Is empathy immoral?
Autor principal: Peterson, Gregory R. 1966- (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado em: [2017]
Em: Zygon
Ano: 2017, Volume: 52, Número: 1, Páginas: 232-257
(Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão:B Bloom, Paul 1963- / Prinz, Jesse J. / Empatia / Ação moral
Classificações IxTheo:AB Filosofia da religião
AE Psicologia da religião
NCC Ética social
Outras palavras-chave:B Paul Bloom
B emotional empathy
B Virtue
B Cognitive empathy
B Dual processing
B Jesse Prinz
B Moral Psychology
Acesso em linha: Volltext (doi)
Descrição
Resumo:The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly.
ISSN:1467-9744
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Zygon
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12330